Abstract-
I. INTRODUCTION
password based remote user authentication scheme is used to check the validity of a login request made by a remote user U to gain the access rights on an authentication server (AS). In these schemes, the AS and the remote user U share a secret, which is often called as password. With the knowledge of this password, the remote user U uses it to create a valid login request to the AS. AS checks the validity of the login request to provide the access rights to the user U. Password authentication schemes with smart cards have a long history in the remote user authentication environment. So far different types of password authentication schemes with smarts cards [3] - [4] - [5] - [6] - [12] - [13] - [14] - [18] - [20] - [21] - [24] - [29] have been proposed. 1 Manoj Kumar is with the Department of Applied Sciences and Humanities, Sharda Group of Institutions (SGI), Jawahar Nagar, Khandri, Agra, India -282004, (e-mail: yamu_balyan@yahoo.co.in) A Lamport [17] proposed the first well-known remote password authentication scheme using smart cards. In Lamport's scheme, the AS stores a password table at the server to check the validity of the login request made by the user. However, high hash overhead and the necessity for password resetting decrease the suitability and practical ability of Lamport's scheme. In addition, the Lamport scheme is vulnerable to a small n attack [7] . Since then, many similar schemes [23] - [26] have been proposed. They all have a common feature: a verification password table should be securely stored in the AS. Actually, this property is a disadvantage for the security point of view. If the password table is stolen /removed /modified by the adversary, the AS will be partially or totally braked/affected.
In 2002, Chien-Jan-Tseng [13] introduced an efficient remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. In 2004, Ku and Chen [31] pointed out some attacks [7] - [28] - [30] on Chien -Jan and Tseng's scheme. According to Ku and Chen, Chien et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to a reflection attack [7] and an insider attack [30] . Ku and Chen claimed that Chien et al.'s scheme is also not reparable [28] . In addition, they also proposed an improved scheme to prevent the attacks: reflection attack and an insider attack on Chien-Jan-Tseng's scheme. In the same year, Hsu [10] pointed out that the Chien-Jan-Tseng's scheme is still vulnerable to a parallel session attack and Yoon et al. [11] claimed that the password change phase of improved scheme of Chien-JanTseng's scheme is still insecure.
A. Contributions
This paper analyzes that the password change phase of Yoon et al.'s scheme is still insecure.
B. Organization
Section II reviews the Ku and Chen's scheme [31] . Section III reviews Hsu [10] and Yoon et al.'s comments on Ku and Chen's scheme .Section IV reviews Yoon et al.'s scheme [11] . Section V is about our observations on the security pitfalls in the password change phase of Yoon et al.'s scheme. Finally, comes to a conclusion in the section VI.
II. REVIEW OF KU AND CHEN'S SCHEME
This section briefly describes Ku and Chen's scheme [31] . This scheme has four phases: the registration phase, login phase, verification phase and the password change phase. All these four phases are described below.
A. Registration Phase
This phase is invoked whenever U initially or re-registers to AS. Let n denotes the number of times U re-registers to AS. The following steps are involved in this phase.
Step.R1: User U selects a random number b and computes PW S = f (b ⊕ PW) and submits her/his identity ID and PW S to the AS through a secure channel.
Step.R2: AS computes a secret number R = f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ PW S , where EID = (ID n) and creates an entry for the user U in his account database and stores n = 0 for initial registration, otherwise set n= n+1, and n denotes the present registration.
Step.R3: AS provides a smart card to the user U through a secure channel. The smart card contains the secret number R and a one-way function f.
Step.R4: User U enters his random number b into his smart card.
B. Login Phase
For login, the user U inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader and then keys the identity and the password to gain the access services. The smart card will perform the following operations:
Step.L1:
Here T U denotes the current date and time of the smart card reader.
Step.L2: Sends a login request C = (ID, C 2 , T U ) to the AS.
C. Verification Phase
Assume AS receives the message C at time T S, where T S is the current date and time at AS.
Then the AS takes the following actions:
Step.V1: If the identity ID and the time T U are not valid, then AS will rejects this login request.
Step.V2: Checks, if
, then the AS accepts the login request and
Otherwise, the login request C will be rejected.
Step.V3: AS sends the pair T S and C 3 to the user U for mutual authentication.
Step.V4: If the time T S is invalid i.e. T U = T S , then U terminates the session. Otherwise, the user U verifies the equation
D. Password Change Phase
This phase is invoked whenever U wants to change his password PW with a new password, say PW new . This phase has the following steps.
Step.P1: U inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader keys the identity and the password and then requests to change the password. Next, U enters a new password PW new .
Step.P2: U's smart cards computes a new secret number
and then replaces R with R new .
III. REVIEW OF HSU AND YOON ET AL.'S COMMENT ON THE KU AND CHEN'S SCHEME

A. Hsu's Comment
According to Hsu, Ku and Chen's scheme is vulnerable to a parallel session attack [10] . The intruder Bob intercepts the communication between the AS and user U and then from this intercepted information, he makes a valid login request to masquerade as a legal user. The intruder Bob applies the following steps for a successful parallel session attack.
Intercepts the login request C = (ID, C 2 , T U ) which is sent by a valid user U to AS.
Intercepts the response message (C 3 , T S ), which is sent by AS to he user U.
Starts a new session with the AS by sending a fabricated login request
The fabricated login request passes all the requirements for a successful authentication of the intruder Bob by the AS, due to the fact that the second part , C 3 , of the login request also satisfies the verification equation Thus, if the malicious user stole the user U's smart card once, only for a small time and then change the valid password with an arbitrary password PW * , then the registered/ legal user U also will not be able to make a valid login request. The AS will not authenticate a registered user U,
IV. YOON ET AL.'S SCHEME
This section briefly describes Yoon et al.'s scheme [11] . This scheme also has four phases: the registration phase, login phase, verification phase and the password change phase. All these four phases are described below.
A. Registration Phase
User U selects a random number b and computes PW S = f (b ⊕ PW) and submits her/his identity ID and PW S to the AS through a secure channel.
AS computes two secret numbers V = f (EID ⊕ x) and R = f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ PW S , where EID
= (ID n) and creates an entry for the user U in his account database and stores n = 0 for initial registration, otherwise set n= n+1, and n denotes the present registration.
AS provides a smart card to the user U through a secure channel. The smart card contains two secret numbers V, R and a one-way function f.
User U enters her/his random number b into his smart card.
B. Login Phase
For login, the user U inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader and then keys the identity and the password to gain access services. The smart card will perform the following operations:
Sends a login request C = (ID, C 2 , T U ) to the AS.
C. Verification Phase
Assume AS receives the message C at time T S , where T S is the current date and time at AS.
Then the AS takes the following actions:
If the identity ID and the time T U is invalid i.e. T U =T S , then AS will rejects this login request.
, then the AS accepts the login request and computes C 3 = f (f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ T S ). Otherwise, the login request C will be rejected.
AS sends the pair T S and C 3 to the user U for mutual authentication.
If the time T S is invalid i.e. T U =T S , then U terminates the session. Otherwise, U verifies the
D. Password Change Phase
This phase is invoked whenever U wants to change his password PW with a new one, say PW new .
This phase has the following steps.
U inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader and then keys her/his identity and the old password PW and then requests to change the password.
U's smart cards computes
Compare this calculated value V* with the secret value V, which is stored in the smart card 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PASSWORD CHANGE PHASE OF YOON ET AL.'S SCHEME
Although, the password change phase of Ku and Chen's scheme is modified by Yoon et al. [11] to remove its security weaknesses. But, we analyze that the modified password phase of Yoon et al.' scheme is still not secure. This section discusses the security weaknesses of the password change phase of Yoon et al.'s scheme and proves that the modified phase is still vulnerable to security attack.
A. Security weaknesses in the Password Change Phase against the Outsiders
Observe the password change phase of Yoon el al.'s scheme, to replace/change the old password PW with a new password PW new , the user/performer should be in possession of the old password PW. The following section describes how any outsider /malicious user can recover the password PW first and then apply this peace of information to make for the success of her/his attack.
It is clear that the smart card of a legal user U in Yoon et al.'s scheme contains: the secret value V, R, and a random number b and a public hash function f. According to Kocher et al. [22] and Messerges et al. [29] , for the security point of view, to store the secret information in smart cards is not a good practice. On the basis of these assumptions [22] - [29] , an antagonist is able to breach the secrets V, R and b, which are stored in the smart card of the user and then he will be able to perform a password guessing attack to obtain the password. For the success of this attack, by using the breached secrets R and b the adversary will perform the following operations:
• The antagonist intercepts the login request C = (ID, C 2 , T U ) and guesses a password PW * .
• Computes C 1
•
Checks if C 2 * ?
= C 2 , then the adversary has correctly guessed the password PW * = PW and C 1 * = C 1 . Otherwise, the adversary goes to step: 1.
Once the adversary has correctly obtained C 1 , instantly, the password PW * corresponding to C 1 will be the correct password and then successfully, he can change the password of the user U.
Consequently, when the smart card was stolen, the antagonist is able to recover the password PW of the user and once the adversary has correctly obtain the password PW, then he will be able to destruct anything of his choice. Since our focus and aim is to show that the password change phase of Yoon et al.'s scheme, which is shown below that an authorized user ( antagonist) can easily replace the old password PW by a new password of her/his choice. For the success, the antagonist applies the following actions.
• Inters the smart card into the smart card reader, enters the identity ID and any password PW and then requests to change the password.
• The smart card of the user computes V* = R ⊕ f (b ⊕ PW) and then compare the computed value V* with the stored value V. Obviously, both the value will be the same, because the adversary has entered the correct password. In this way, the smart card accepts the password change request.
• Selects a new password PW Thus, if the malicious user stole the user U's smart card she/he will be able to make a destructive action of her/his choice. Thus, the adversary is able to change the password with a new password of his/his choice. Now the registered/ legal user U also will not be able to make a valid login request with her/his valid smart card because now the her/his old password PW will not work . Suppose the user U is using the same password PW continuously, which is supplied by the AS at the time of registration, then the insider at AS will be able to change the password PW with a new password of her/his choice. If the smart card is in possession of an antagonist insider at AS for short time, then first, the insider inters the smart card into the smart card reader and can directly supply the value V to the smart card reader. Either, he directly supplies V or in place of f (b ⊕ PW), he supplies the value PW S without using the hash button. Next, the antagonist insider enters a new Thus, if the malicious insider stole the user U's smart card once, only for a small time and then he can replace the user's password forever in such a way that the user U also will not be able to make a valid login request with her/his valid smart card because now the her/his old password PW will not work properly.
B. Security weaknesses in the Password
Thus the Yoon et al.'s password change phase is still insecure and that is under the threat of poor reparability.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper analyzed that security weaknesses still exist in the password change phase of modified scheme of Yoon et al.'s scheme. The password change phase is still vulnerable to security attacks by an outsider as well as an antagonist insider at AS. Thus, the security pitfalls still exist in Yoon et al.'s scheme.
